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Seldom are observed losing bids available in industry data.  A special workshop of the Fed 
Cattle Market Simulator was designed to capture bids for each pen of cattle traded.  Data 
enabled identifying buyer and seller behavior in the price discovery process, both before and 
after imposed mergers of the two largest and two smallest packer teams.  Highest losing bids 
also were estimated with packer bid functions and compared with observed highest losing bids.  
An estimated price discovery model indicated market structure as measured by number of buyers 
was more important than simply the number of bids or size of transactions. 
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Introduction  
Crespi and Sexton’s (2004, 2005) award-wining research on bid shading in the 
procurement market for fed cattle cited two key weaknesses in the data.  One was not having 
unsuccessful bids; and the other was not knowing how many bids were received for each lot of 
cattle.  Data limitations led to implicit assumptions of the fed cattle market studied.  For 
example, one implicit assumption was that feedlots seek bids from all buyers for each pen of 
cattle traded, thus leading to a distribution of losing bids which can be compared with winning 
bids (i.e., sale prices).  Hunnicutt, Bailey, and Crook (2004), using the same data as Crespi and 
Sexton, found that a majority of feedlots (57%) preferred trading with a single packer.  This 
finding raises a question regarding another implicit assumption by Crespi and Sexton, that sellers 
do or always would sell cattle to the highest bidder.  In fact, given their preferences for a single 
packer and the importance of preserving a long-standing buyer-seller relationship, they 
conceivably might reject occasional higher bids rather than jeopardize their trading relationship 
with a preferred buyer. Until recently, data were not available to confirm or refute assumptions such as some in 
Crespi and Sexton’s research (2004, 2005).  The Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) provides 
unique data with which to better understand buyer-seller behavior; though the author (and one of 
the FCMS developers) clearly recognizes that data from the market simulator are not data from 
the “real-world” fed cattle market.  Results presented here with market simulator data have 
implications for future research related to what Crespi and Sexton (2004) describe as a key issue 
in the beef industry, i.e., buyer competition for fed cattle.  Data from the market simulator 
challenge some conventional assumptions and provide insight into buyer-seller relationships and 
behavior.  One frequently made assumption is that buyers control the competitive environment 
regarding price discovery; when in fact, price discovery by one long-used definition involves 
both buyers and sellers (Thomsen and Foote 1952).  Thus, seller behavior is important also, as 
are the relationships between buyers and sellers as found by Hunnicutt, Bailey, and Crook 
(2004). 
The overall objective of this research is to determine the strategic behavior of buyers and 
sellers in competing for and marketing fed cattle in an experimental market representative of the 
real-world fed cattle market.  This paper reports on bids (offers) and purchases (sales) by buyer-
seller pairs, trades involving multiple pens of cattle, trades where bids exceed sale prices, highest 
losing bids and estimated highest losing bids relative to successful bids, and market 
consolidation effects on each of the above components of buyer-seller behavior.  
Procedure and Data 
A specially-designed workshop conducted with the FCMS generated bid data not 
generally available from the experimental market (Tostao 2006).  Winning and losing bids 
resulted from first-price auctions just as were successful bids available to Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005) and Hunnicutt, Bailey, and Crook (2004).  A graduate student was assigned to each 
FCMS feedlot team to monitor and record bidding activity for each pen of cattle sold during each 
trading period.  Thus actual bids were captured along with the usual data from the market 
simulator (Ward 2005).  Experimental market data were available for 14 weeks, 8 in a pre-
merger period and 6 in a post-merger period.  Mergers between the two largest and two smallest 
packers were imposed on the market to determine the effects on buyers, sellers, buyer-seller 
relationships, resulting bidding behavior, competition, and prices.  Available data consisted of 
the winning live cattle price, losing bids, boxed beef price, show list, winning buyer, losing 
rivals, feedlot, cattle weight, cattle genetic type, and trading week. 
Bid and sale/purchase information was summarized in a variety of ways to identify 
similarities and differences in buyer and seller behavior.  Examples include: developing the 
distribution of purchases (sales) from feedlots by packers (by feedlots to packers), distribution of 
purchases (sales) by number of bids made (received), mean prices and variation by buyer and 
seller as well as by number of bids made, distribution of purchases (sales) in multiple pens of 
cattle at the same price, purchases (sales) at prices less than highest bids, and the relationship 
between losing bids (when observed) with winning bids.  Regression models similar to those 
estimated previously with experimental market data (Ward 2005) were estimated to explain the 
variation in winning prices, especially from the extent of bidding and buyer competition before 
and after the imposed packer mergers. 
Summary statistics of the data are shown for the pre-merger and post-merger periods in 
Table 1.  In each time period, one packer bid on significantly more pens of cattle than other 
packers, but bids per pen averaged less than two.  As the HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) indicates, the imposed mergers greatly increased the degree of market concentration during the 
post-merger period. 
Buyer-Seller Relationships and Bidding Characteristics 
Several tables detail various aspects of trading between buyers and sellers during the 
experimental simulation.  However, for space considerations, only a few are included in this 
paper.  Anyone wanting further information can contact the author.  Instead of including some 
tables, brief comments on the nature of trading are discussed to highlight differences in buyer-
seller relationships.  
Purchases, marketings by firm – Purchases from feedlots by packers varied.  For example, 
packer 2 purchased more than a third of its cattle in the pre-merger period (35.9%) from feedlot 5 
and none from feedlot 7 (0%).  Packers 1 and 3 purchased some cattle from every feedlot with 
less concentrated purchases from any single feedlot (packer 1, 1.5-20.0%; packer 3, 4.3-23.4%). 
  Viewed from the feedlot perspective, some feedlots preferred certain packers more than 
others.  For example, feedlot 3 sold more than half of its cattle to packer 3 (57.9%) but sold some 
to each packer.  Feedlot 5 sold nearly half (48.9%) to packer 2, but none (0%) to packer 4.  
Feedlot preference for a specific packer tended to increase dramatically in the more concentrated 
post-merger environment.  Two feedlots sold either exclusively (feedlot 4, 100%) or almost 
exclusively (feedlot 5, 97.4) to a single packer. 
  In summary, this initial look at trading relationships seems consistent with findings by 
Hunnicutt, Bailey, and Crook (2004), that buyer-seller relationships matter in price discovery 
and to market competition. 
Bids made, received by firm – Few feeders sold cattle with bids from all four packers; or stated 
conversely, few packers purchased cattle with all four packers having bid on them.  For example, no pens of cattle purchased by packer 4 had four bids on them; and at the other extreme, 4.3% of 
cattle purchased by packer 3 had 4 bids on them in the pre-merger period.  For all four packers, 
most cattle were purchased with two bids (75.0-78.7%).  After the imposed mergers, a higher 
percentage of pens had bids from all available packers but that meant a maximum of two bids. 
  From the feedlot view, 5 feedlots never sold cattle with four bids for them.   Feedlot 5 
sold 80.8% of its cattle with a single bid.  Feedlot 2 seemed most adept at securing bids, 
marketing the lowest percentage of its cattle with one bid (13.2%) and nearly the most with four 
bids (7.9%).  For all feeders, the post-merger period saw more cattle sold with a single bid 
though three feedlots were able to sell more than half their cattle (from 52.6 to 59.0%) with bids 
from both merged packers. 
  Average prices paid (received) varied by number of bids.  However, viewing the mean 
and standard variation by packer, by feedlot, and by period shows little evidence number of bids 
was important in the price discovery outcome.  While there were mean and standard deviation 
difference, there was no consistent pattern according to number of bids.  As such, this result 
tends to refute research conducted in the 1980s and 1990s which often showed that prices 
increased as number of bids or buyers increased (see review of several studies by Ward 2002).  
Other market conditions such as availability of information, the spatial dimension of the market, 
and degree of consolidation may affect the bid-price relationship. 
  In summary, feeders apparently did not seek bids from all buyers and/or all buyers did 
not attempt to bid on all pens of cattle.  This is contrary to the implicit assumption in the Crespi 
and Sexton (2004, 2005) study.  However, had more bids been made on cattle sold, there was no 
clear evidence higher prices would have resulted. Multiple pen purchases, marketings by firm – In early work on price discovery for fed cattle, 
data were collected on pens of cattle sold and nearly every pen represented a separate transaction 
(for example, Ward 1981).  In the 1990s, likely a product of packer consolidation, packers more 
frequently bid on multiple pens of cattle, including entire show lists at a single price.  Thus, bids 
were not received on each pen individually.  This led to two results; quantity of cattle purchased 
(and marketed) per transaction increased and transaction costs declined for packers and feeders.  
Evidence from the FCMS shows the same behavior of buyers and sellers in the experimental 
market as in the real-world market. 
  From the distribution of purchases (marketings) by number of pens bundled in a single 
transaction, variation was observed across buyers and sellers.  For example, packer 4 purchased 
more than half of its cattle in multiple pens of 4 or 5 (54.4%). Packer 2 purchased 10.9% in 
groups of 6 pens or more.  At the other extreme, packer 2 purchased nearly a third of its cattle in 
single-pen purchases (32.8%), more than any other packer.  Multiple-pen purchases clearly 
increased with the increase in packer consolidation.  Packer 1-2, the smaller of the two packers in 
the post-merger period, bought over two-thirds of its cattle (68.3%) in groups of 5 or more pens. 
  Feeders, too, appeared to package cattle in groups of multiple pens.  Only feedlot 3 sold 
as much as a third of its cattle in single-pen transactions (34.2%).  Three feedlots (2, 5, and 6) 
sold a quarter or more of their cattle in groups of 5 or more pens (26.3%, 27.7%, and 25.0%, 
respectively).  Note for feedlots placing about 3-6 pens of cattle weekly in the experimental 
market, many were marketing entire weight groups of cattle as a single transaction. 
  The market structure change again significantly affected feeders’ apparent willingness to 
market cattle in larger groups.  Seven of 8 feedlots sold a smaller percentage of cattle in single-pen transactions and all 8 sold a higher percentage in groups of 5 pens or more in the post-
merger period. 
  In summary, experimental market data clearly show that packers do not bid on each pen 
of cattle, instead purchasing multiple pens in a single transaction.  Feeders, too, apparently 
preferred marketing multiple pens in a single lot rather than attempting to market single-pen 
sale lots. 
Purchases, sales and highest losing bid(s) – Thus far, data from the experimental market 
confirm that packers do not bid on each pen of cattle and feeders do not seek bids from each 
packer for each pen.  As a result of many pens of cattle being traded after only a single bid and 
multiple pens of cattle traded in a single transaction, the observance or availability of a highest 
losing bid does not exist as frequently as Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005) implicitly assumed. 
Table 2 summarizes transactions for which a highest losing bid was observed and 
transactions for which no losing bid was observed.  A highest losing bid was observed for 51.8% 
of pens traded in the pre-merger period.  However, with a more concentrated buying structure, 
the percentage of observed losing bids dropped to 34.6% in the post-merger period.  More 
differences were noted among feeders in the number of pens marketed for which a losing bid 
existed than among packers.  As implied from the earlier discussion, some feeders apparently 
were more successful or had a stronger preference for receiving more than a single bid on pens 
of cattle sold. 
  Also computed were the number of pens of cattle purchased (sold) for which the highest 
bid exceeded the sale price.  Perhaps the most common example of how this happens is when a 
feedlot passes on (i.e., rejects) a bid for their cattle (expecting a higher bid later), but cannot get 
another packer to bid the same or a higher price and is forced to accept a lower price later than the earlier bid.  The frequency of the winning packer paying a price below another packer’s bid 
or of a feedlot having to accept a lower price than was bid by another packer was not large, 6.3% 
of all pre-merger transactions and 5.5% of post-merger transactions.  While not large, it is 
important to note the phenomena occurred.  
  Lastly, Table 2 reports the average difference between the winning bid and highest losing 
bid (when observed) for purchases (sales).  Average bid-vs.-sale price differences ranged from 
$0.25-0.50/cwt. for packers and $0.22-0.76/cwt. for feeders during the pre-merger period.  
Differences narrowed for some firms and widened for others during the post-merger period.  
These differences for both periods provide evidence of the a priori expectation some feedlot and 
packer teams would be better negotiators than others. 
  In summary, highest losing bids were not observed for over half of all transactions in the 
two periods combined.  Also, there was evidence that in a small percentage of cases, feeders 
failed to accept the highest bid from packers.  Differences between the winning bid and highest 
losing bid (when observed) varied among packers and feedlots and appeared to be influenced by 
market consolidation but not in a consistent manner. 
Winning Bids versus Actual and Estimated Losing Bids 
Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005), faced with not having losing bids to determine the extent 
packers bid lower than their valuation of the fed cattle being purchased, estimated losing bids.  
They derived and estimated four, plant-specific bid functions for the three largest packing firms 
competing in the Texas panhandle over the data period. 
Similar packer bid functions were estimated with the available experimental market data.  
The model estimated for each packer was 
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− + + + + =αwhere BoxedBeef is the wholesale price of beef sold by packers, ShowList is the available cattle 
packers can purchase each week, LiveWt is the live weight of cattle (1125, 1150, 1175 lbs.), and 
Genetics is the known set of carcass components for each pen of cattle (low quality-high yielding 
cattle, medium quality-medium yielding cattle, high quality-low yielding cattle).  Several 
variables in the Crespi-Sexton models were not applicable or held constant in the experimental 
market data; e.g., yield grade and quality grade were incorporated in Genetics, sale lot size is 
fixed at 100 head, distance to the plant is not applicable in a market without a spatial dimension, 
and day of the week was not relevant in a trading week unit.  Crespi and Sexton estimated their 
bid functions with dummy variables for each week.  Here, the ShowList variable and BoxedBeef 
combine to proxy the overall market price level for each week. 
  The above procedure generated highest losing bids for all transactions in the experimental 
market data set in a manner similar to that followed by Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005).  Table 3 
shows a comparison of actual highest losing bids (when observed) for each packer and estimated 
highest losing bids for the same transactions in both the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  
Packer bid functions yielded estimated highest losing bids which were significantly above actual 
highest losing bids and slightly above winning bids on average.  Therefore, packer bid functions 
overestimated highest losing bids compared with actual, observed highest losing bids.  Accuracy 
of the estimated highest losing bids procedure was lower in the more concentrated market 
following mergers of the two smallest and two largest packers. 
  Readers should be cautioned that one cannot directly compare results of efforts here to 
estimate highest losing bids with those of Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005).  However, their 
estimated highest losing bids were above observed highest winning bids by a greater amount 
than was the case in the experimental market.  Similarly, one cannot determine the accuracy of their procedure since highest losing bids were not observed in the data they had available.  
However, it is clear that the accuracy of the estimation procedure is critically important to any 
further analysis on potential bid shading and conclusions from simulations which use estimated 
losing bids in lieu of actual losing bids.  If – and a critical if – the Crespi-Sexton procedure 
overestimated highest losing bids, as is implied by estimated highest losing bids with 
experimental data, the overestimation  led to an overstatement of bid shading by packers in their 
study by some unknown amount. 
Competition Impacts – Number of Bids versus Number of Buyers  
Two components of competition in price discovery are number of bids and number of 
bidders or buyers.  While the two may seem inextricably linked, they are not identical, especially 
as market consolidation increases.  Number of bids is affected by the preference and propensity 
of sellers to seek bids from available buyers as well as the preference and propensity of buyers to 
bid on all available fed cattle.  As shown above, some sellers are more adept at seeking bids than 
others and some buyers have a higher propensity to bid on cattle from many feedlots than others.  
Number of bidders or buyers is related primarily to the market structure in which price discovery 
occurs.   Number of buyers occurs independently of sellers’ preferences and behavior in a static 
sense.  In this research, pre-merger and post-merger periods directly determined the number of 
buyers. 
A price discovery model was estimated similar to one reported in Ward (2005) to 
determine the effect number of bids, multiple-pen sales, and number of buyers had on prices paid 
and received.  The model estimated was (2)    
MktStruc B NmbrPens B NmbrBids B
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where Feedlot is the seller (1-8), Packer is the buyer (1-4), NmbrBids is a dummy variable (1=1  
is bid, 2=>1 bid), NmbrPens is a dummy variable (1=1 pen, 2=>1 pen), and  BoxedBeef,  
ShowList, LiveWt, and Genetics were defined above.  MktStruc was included in two ways.  One 
was a dummy variable (1=pre-merger period, 2=post-merger period) in one version of the model 
and the weekly computed HHI was used in the second. 
  The model was estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to account for 
heteroskedasticity present in the experimental market data.  Regression results are presented in 
Table 4.  Both models explained a high percentage of the variation in transaction prices for the 
experimental simulation period (adj R
2=0.936-0.942).  Note the two models differed only by the 
two versions of the MktStruc variable. 
  Signs and significance for most variables were expected and/or were reasonable given 
previous experience with FCMS data (e.g., BoxedBeef, Showlist, LiveWt, Genetics, Feedlot, and 
Packer).  Number of bids was not significant in either version of the model, nor was number of 
pens purchased in a singe transaction.  However both versions of the MktStruc variable were 
negative and significant.  Prices in the post-merger period, when market consolidation was much 
higher, were $2.31/cwt. (3.0%) lower than in the pre-merger period with twice the number of 
buyers (packers).  For the model where the HHI was substituted for the merger dummy variable, 
a one-unit increase in the HHI after the imposed mergers (where HHI was expressed in decimal, 
i.e., 0.5118) was associated with a price decline of $9.39/cwt. for fed cattle traded.   In this case, number of bids and number of pens traded per transaction was less important 
than the market structure in which price discovery occurred.  The imposed mergers, halving the 
number of buyers from 4 to 2 and nearly doubling the mean HHI from 2640 to 5118, had a 
significant negative effect on prices paid and received. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Oftentimes, economists focus on buyer behavior at the exclusion of seller behavior in the 
price discovery process.  Seller behavior is likely of lesser importance but should not be ignored.  
Buyer-seller preferences, strategies, relationships, and practices combine to influence the 
competitive process and resulting discovered prices. 
This research, with an experimental market designed to mimic the real fed cattle market 
among buyers and among sellers, demonstrated differences exist regarding trading relationships, 
bids made (received), and multiple-pen purchases (marketings).  A special workshop with the 
Fed Cattle Market Simulator was designed specifically to capture losing bids.  Thus, perhaps for 
the first time, actual losing bids were observed along with winning bids in a first price auction.  
Far fewer losing bids were observed than were assumed in prior research with industry data.  
Evidence supports the contention that buyers at times pass (reject) bids which, in hindsight, were 
higher than later bids received for the same cattle.  It was found here that observed highest losing 
bids were not as high as estimated by individual packer bid functions.  Given the differences 
between actual and estimated losing bids, care must be exercised when interpreting and using 
estimated losing bids in lieu of actual losing bids. 
Number of available buyers was much more important than number of bids received or 
the number of pens bundled into a single transaction.  Thus, economists are correct to be concerned about market structure, defined here by number of competing firms, moreso than 
some buyer-seller practices such as number of bids make (received) per transaction.   
Lastly, I want to make clear any apparent criticism of the Crespi-Sexton research (2004, 
2005) is not intended to denigrate their innovative work.  As a reviewer of both published 
articles, I supported publication because of the contribution each made to an important issue.  
The intent of this paper is to highlight the importance and care all researchers must place on 
understanding the nature of the market being studied.  Such understanding is critical to the 
relevancy of research findings.  Researchers should strive to make the best assumptions possible 
for any given research study; and those of us with many years in the profession certainly have 
made necessary – and likely questionable – assumptions over time.  It is equally imperative that 
we recognize how alternative assumptions might alter our findings and that the best available 
methodology may not adequately replace complete, detailed data.  Unfortunately, we can only 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for pre-merger and post-merger periods 
Pre-Merger Period       
Variable Observations  Mean 
Standard 
 deviation 
   
Packer 1 bids ($/cwt)  125  78.76  0.87 
Packer 2 bids ($/cwt)  121  78.68  2.73 
Packer 3 bids ($/cwt)  126  79.34  0.77 
Packer 4 bids ($/cwt)  163  78.80  0.95 
Bids per transaction  302  1.77  0.85 
Live weight price ($/cwt)  302  79.22  0.80 
Boxed beef price (t-1) ($/cwt)  302  125.31  2.49 
Show list pens  302  113.36  4.21 
HHI 302  2640.82  91.82 
      
Post-Merger Period       
Variable Observations  Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
   
Packer 1-2 bids ($/cwt)  179  74.31  1.51 
Packer 3-4 bids ($/cwt)  210  74.70  1.62 
Bids per transaction  289  1.36  0.48 
Live weight price ($/cwt)  289  74.74  1.53 
Boxed beef price (t-1) ($/cwt)  289  121.71  2.84 
Show list pens  289  131.18  8.82 
HHI 289  5118.32  106.40 
    
 
 Table 2.  Sale price versus highest losing bid for purchases (marketings) by packer (feedlot), 





    
  1 2 3 4         
Number of pens with a highest losing bid  31  38  48  40         
Number of pens without a highest losing bid  35  26  46  39         
Mean sale price less highest losing bid ($/cwt.)  0.49  0.50  0.25  0.47         
          
Post-merger  period  Winning  Packer        
  1-2  3-4        
Number of pens with a highest losing bid  47  53             
Number of pens without a highest losing bid  79  53             
Mean sale price less highest losing bid ($/cwt.)  0.32  1.01             
          
Pre-merger period  Feedlot 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of pens with a highest losing bid  24  33  23  15  9  24  9  20 
Number of pens without a highest losing bid  13  5  15  26  38  16  19  13 
Mean sale price less highest losing bid ($/cwt.)  0.22  0.26  0.76  0.29  0.63  0.35  0.32  0.60 
          
Post-merger period  Feedlot 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of pens with a highest losing bid  23  20  20  9  3  12  5  8 
Number of pens without a highest losing bid  16  18  15  26  36  23  27  28 
Mean sale price less highest losing bid ($/cwt.)  0.07  1.01  0.56  -0.17  1.63  1.23  0.86  1.63  
 
Table 3. Mean actual and estimated highest losing bids for purchases by packer,   
pre-merger and post-merger periods 
        
Pre-merger period         
 Winning  packer 
  1 2 3 4 
 
(Mean price and Standard deviation)
a
($/cwt.) 
Actual  HLB  0.49 0.50 0.25 0.47 
  (0.610)  0.755   0.531   0.776  
Est. HLB  -0.03  -0.10  -0.02  0.15 
  0.536   0.633   0.610   0.589  
Difference  0.52 0.60 0.26 0.31 
  0.780   0.908   0.707   0.998  
        
Post-merger period         
 Winning  packer   
 1-2  3-4   
 
(Mean price and Standard Deviation)
a
($/cwt.)    
Actual HLB  0.32  1.01     
 1.053  1.281     
Est. HLB  -0.15  -0.17     
 0.869  0.831     
Difference 0.47  1.77     
 1.064  0.328     
        
a Standard deviation is in parentheses.       
 
  
Table 4. FGLS regression results for bid and merger effects on price discovery 
       
Dependent variable       
Transaction price ($/cwt.)     
        
Independent variable    Coefficient
a
      Model 1  Model 2 
Intercept     81.075***  78.763*** 
     (53.40)  (48.16) 
Boxed beef t-1  0.086***  0.084*** 
     (8.27)  (7.59) 
Showlistt    -0.092***  -0.091*** 
     (19.85)  (17.98) 
Wt-1125     0.075  0.122 
     (1.00)  (1.53) 
Wt-1150     Base  Base 
        
Wt-1175     -0.968***  -0.908*** 
     (4.51)  (4.05) 
Genetic-Lo   -0.281***  -0.279*** 
     (3.89)  (3.63) 
Genetic-Med   Base  Base 
        
Genetic-Hi   0.0.045  0.044 
     (0.81)  (0.74) 
Feedlot 1      -0.427***  -0.498*** 
     (3.32)  (3.63) 
Feedlot 2      -0.248*  -0.316** 
     (1.94)  (2.34) 
Feedlot 3      0.06  0.044 
     (0.53)  (0.37) 
Feedlot 4      -0.630***  -0.648*** 
     (5.23)  (5.05) 
Feedlot 5      0.447***  0.447*** 
     (3.70)  (3.47) 
Feedlot 6      0.045  0.004 
     (0.34)  (0.03) 
Feedlot 7      -0.318**  -0.340*** 
     (2.72)  (2.71) 
Feedlot 8      Base  Base 
        
Packer 1      Base  Base 
        
Packer 2      0.541***  0.544*** 
     (8.45)  (8.01) 
Packer 3      0.945***  0.968*** 
     (12.97)  (12.53) 
        Table 4. FGLS regression results for bid and merger effects on price discovery 
       
Dependent variable     
Transaction price ($/cwt.)   
      
Independent variable   







Packer 4      0.576***  0.605*** 
        
      (5.44) 
Bid=1     Base  Base 
        
Bid>1     -0.079  0.058 
     (1.33)  (0.92) 
Pens=1     Base  Base 
        
Pens>1     -0.057  -0.042 
     (0.69)  (0.48) 
Pre-merger period    NA  Base 
        
Post-merger period    NA  -2.310 
       (19.34) 
HHI     -9.394  NA 
     (21.41)   
Adj R
2    0.942  0.936 
        
n     591  591 
a Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of calculated t statistics; *=0.10, **=0.05, and ***=0.01 
significance level. 